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Abstract
We present an axiomatic model of preferences over menus that is motivated by
three assumptions. First, the decision maker is uncertain ex ante (i.e. at the time
of choosing a menu) about her ex post (i.e. at the time of choosing an option within
her chosen menu) preferences over options, and she anticipates that this subjective
uncertainty will not resolve before the ex post stage. Second, she is averse to ex
post indecisiveness (i.e. to having to choose between options that she cannot rank
with certainty). Third, when evaluating a menu she discards options that are
dominated (i.e. inferior to another option whatever her ex post preferences may
be) and restricts attention to the undominated ones. Under these assumptions, the
decision maker has a preference for commitment in the sense of preferring menus
with fewer undominated alternatives. We derive a representation in which the
decision maker's uncertainty about her ex post preferences is captured by means of
a subjective state space, which in turn determines which options are undominated
in a given menu, and in which the decision maker fears, whenever indecisive, to
choose an option that will turn out to be the worst (undominated) one according
to the realization of her ex post preferences.
Keywords. Opportunity sets, subjective uncertainty, indecisiveness, dominance.
JEL Classication. D81.
1 Introduction
Consider a two-stage decision situation. In the rst stage, the decision maker has to
choose a menu (or opportunity set). In the second stage, she has to choose an option
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Park, 2006 Johannesburg, South Africa. E-mail: zimper@bigfoot.comfrom this menu. We refer to these two stages as the ex ante and ex post stage, respectively.
We assume that the decision maker is uncertain ex ante about her ex post preferences
over options. Standard models in the literature on opportunity sets use this assumption
in order to motivate a desire for exibility (Kreps, 1979; Nehring, 1999; Dekel, Lipman,
and Rustichini, 2001; Dekel, Lipman, Rustichini, and Sarver, 2007a; Ozdenoren, 2002;
Epstein, Marinacci, and Seo, 2007). According to these models, larger menus can never
be worse than smaller ones when a decision maker expects to learn her ex post preferences
before actually having to choose an option. In contrast to these approaches, we consider
a decision maker who anticipates that her uncertainty about her ex post preferences will
only resolve after she will have chosen an option. Such a decision maker will nd herself at
the ex post stage, at least for some menus, in a situation of indecisiveness, i.e. of having
to choose an option without being certain which option she prefers. We assume that
the decision maker is averse to such situations of indecisiveness and, therefore, prefers
smaller menus to larger ones, to the extent that smaller menus enable her to avoid these
situations.
As an illustrative example, consider Bethy, who is a manager of a small division in
a large company. She is faced with the problem of assigning the execution of a project
to one of the employees. Right now she can only choose among the employees in her
division, whom she knows well and has previously observed in similar projects. She is
rather certain that Alan would be the best person to entrust with the project. However,
just before Bethy can make the decision, the CEO of the company contacts her and
suggests that she now has the possibility to pick an employee not just from her own
division, but from the entire company sta. Bethy has only limited knowledge of the
sta outside her division. In particular, she knows that Bob and Chris are well suited
to execute the project, but she nds these two candidates hard to compare: e.g., Bob
would be excellent on the nancial side of the project, but Chris would do better than
Bob when it comes to marketing. Bethy knows that these two dimensions are important
for the success of the project, but the current situation makes it dicult to foresee which
one will be the most important. She is faced with a hard choice: she has to make an
important decision (for the company, for her career and that of the person who will be in
charge of the project), and take full responsibility for this decision in front of the CEO,
without being able to condently go for either one of the possible options. In fact, she
would have much preferred sticking to her division, which would have avoided her this
situation of indecisiveness altogether. Thus she would be willing to forego candidates
that are potentially better than Alan (in fact, she may even be sure that, e.g., Chris
is superior to Alan in all regards) in order to avoid the pain of having to choose in a
situation of indecisiveness.1.
1In this sense, the decision maker who conforms to our theory prefers to avoid taking responsibility
for her decisions. This interpretation was suggested to us by Klaus Nehring.
2A menu, in this example, is a set of employees from which Bethy has to choose whom to
assign the execution of the project. For simplicity, let us assume that Alan (A), Bob (B),
and Chris (C) are the only available employees in the company, so menus are nonempty
subsets of fA;B;Cg. Bethy has preferences over these menus. That she prefers picking
an employee from her division only rather than from the whole company means that she
prefers the singleton menu fAg (she has to choose Alan) to the grand menu fA;B;Cg
(she can choose Alan, Bob, or Chris).
This preference pattern can be captured by means of the following representation.
Suppose Bethy envisions two possible scenarios: the most important dimension of the
project may be either nance (f) or marketing (m). In each scenario s = f;m, she
is able to come up with a numerical evaluation us : fA;B;Cg ! R of all employees.
Namely, these evaluations are given by the following table:
A B C
f 5 8 6
m 5 3 7
Thus, the set U = fuf;umg is a subjective state space capturing Bethy's ex ante uncer-
tainty about her ex post preferences over candidates. Note that Alan is clearly \domi-
nated" by Chris, no matter what subjective state eventually realizes. Hence, even though
Bethy does not expect to know which dimension of the project turns out to be the most
important one before she has to choose an employee, she knows ex ante that Alan is by no
means the optimal employee within the grand menu. Bob and Chris, on the other hand,
cannot be ranked in this manner, as which one is more valuable depends on which subjec-
tive states realizes. Hence she anticipates ex ante that the grand menu will leave her in a
situation of indecisiveness between Bob and Chris. In general, when evaluating a menu,
Bethy rst discards all dominated employees and restricts attention to undominated ones.
Thus within the grand menu fA;B;Cg she restricts attention to the submenu fB;Cg
(and within the singleton menu fAg she trivially restricts attention to fAg itself). More-
over, being indecisiveness averse, Bethy imagines that no matter which subjective state
realizes, she will always end up choosing the worst possible (undominated) employee.




Finally, Bethy obtains an ex ante numerical evaluation of a menu by aggregating the two
subjective state-contingent evaluations through some increasing function from R2 to R.
If, for example, she simply sums up the two evaluations, then the singleton menu fAg is
3more valuable than the grand menu fA;B;Cg (10 > 9).
In this paper, we take as primitive a preference relation over menus of lotteries and
axiomatize the representation described above. Our model extends previous work by
Guerdjikova and Zimper (2008), who model the trade-o between a desire for commitment
arising from the presence of incomparable options and a desire for exibility arising
from the possibility that nature may eliminate some options between the ex ante and
ex post stages. The extension is only partial since we focus on their desire for exibility
motive, thus ignoring their desire for exibility motive. On the other hand, we axiomatize
a full-edged representation of preferences over menus whereas their main result only
axiomatizes a characterization of the preference maximizing menu. Moreover, we work
with a larger class of menus than they do.
Our representation exhibits a preference for commitment, once one restricts attention
to undominated options. In other words, the decision maker always prefers a menu with
a smaller set of undominated options. It is noteworthy that our representation does
not identify which option will eventually be chosen by the decision maker (not even
contingently on the subjective state since, in fact, the decision maker does not know the
subjective state at the time of choosing an option). Thus our notion of indecisiveness
aversion arises from the fact of having to choose without knowing one's own preferences
rather than from the outcome of this choice. In this regard, our model diers from
models of temptation (Gul and Pesendorfer, 2001; Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini, 2009),
regret (Sarver, 2008), costly contemplation (Ergin and Sarver, 2008), or thinking aversion
(Ortoleva, 2008).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the general setup (menus and
preferences). Section 3 introduces and discusses a concept that is central to our analysis:
a dominance relation over options (which is usual in the literature on preference for
exibility but has a slightly dierent interpretation in our model). Section 4 denes our
representation concept and highlights some special cases. In Section 5 our axioms are
stated and discussed. Section 6 contains our representation theorem and a proof sketch.
Section 7 concludes. The Appendix contains the proof of the representation theorem and
auxiliary lemmas.
2 Setup
Let B be a nite set of prizes and let (B) be the set of all probability distributions
(lotteries) over B which stand for the options of our approach. Given ;0 2 (B) and
 2 [0;1], we dene the -mixture of  and 0 as usual and denote it by  + (1   )0.
A non-empty subset x of (B) is interpreted as an opportunity set or menu, i.e. as the
commitment to choose some lottery  2 x at a given later date. We refer to the choice
of a menu as the ex ante stage and to the (implicit) choice of a lottery within the chosen
4menu as the ex post stage. We endow the set of lotteries with the Euclidean metric and
the set of menus with the Hausdor metric (see e.g. Schneider, 1993).
We restrict attention to menus that are polytopes, i.e. convex hulls of (non-empty)
nite sets of lotteries. We can view these menus as determined by a nite set of linear
constraints or, equivalently, we can think of the decision maker as considering nite
menus but being able to randomize between options. This restriction is necessary for
our representation theorem to hold (see Appendix). Let X denote the set of all such
menus. We consider a decision maker endowed with a weak preference relation % over X,
capturing her ex ante ranking of menus. From % we dene the strict preference relation
 and the indierence relation  as usual.
3 The Dominance Relation




0 , fg  conv(f;
0g);
where conv() denotes convex hull. From % we dene the relations % and  as usual.
Moreover, since % can (and, in general, will) be incomplete, we denote by ./ its noncom-
parability relation. We interpret the relation  % 0 as meaning that the decision maker
decisively weakly prefers  to 0, i.e. is certain ex ante that she will weakly prefer  to 0
ex post. That is to say, even if she is uncertain ex ante about her ex post preferences, all
ex post preferences she deems possible are such that  is weakly preferred to 0. We now
explain why this is naturally characterized by the singleton menu fg being indierent
(according to the primitive preference relation) to the larger (and, hence, more exible)
menu conv(f;0g).
First, assume the decision maker decisively weakly prefers  to 0 (i.e.  % 0).
Then adding 0 to the singleton menu fg should neither improve nor worsen this menu
(the convex hull is just to have a menu in X). In fact, in this case we should also have
conv(f;0g) % f0g, a property that will follow from our axioms (see Lemma 2 in the
Appendix). Conversely, suppose that the decision maker does not decisively weakly prefer
 to 0. This may be the case for two reasons:
 First, she may decisively strictly prefer 0 to  (i.e. 0  ). In this case,
adding 0 to the singleton menu fg should improve this menu, so we should
have conv(f;0g)  fg (as well as f0g  conv(f;0g), see Lemma 2 in the
Appendix).
 Second, she may be indecisive between  and 0 (i.e.  ./ 0). In this case,
under our assumption that she is averse to such indecisiveness, we should have
fg  conv(f;0g) and f0g  conv(f;0g) (see Lemma 2 in the Appendix).
5In both cases, we do not have fg  conv(f;0g), justifying the above denition.
Note that our dominance relation is very similar Kreps (1979)'s \domination" relation,
and also has a similar interpretation. The only dierence is that in the absence of decisive
preference/dominance, the decision maker prefers larger menus in Kreps (1979)' model
whereas she prefers smaller menus in our model. Of course, this just reects the fact
that Kreps (1979) assumes the decision maker expects to learn her ex post preferences
before choosing a lottery whereas we assume she does not. Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini
(2001), who neither assume that the decision maker prefers larger menus nor smaller ones
in the most general model they consider, also use a similar denition and interpretation
in their comparative notion of subjective uncertainty.
From % we dene the set c(x) of undominated (i.e. not strictly dominated) lotteries
in a menu x 2 X by




Under our assumption that the decision maker discards all dominated lotteries and re-
stricts attention to undominated ones, she should be indierent between choosing a lottery
in x or in c(x) (see Lemma 2 in the Appendix).
4 Representation
We look for a representation of % as follows:
Denition. An indecisiveness averse representation of % is a couple (U;g), where
U  RB is nonempty, closed, convex, and such that for all ;0 2 (B),
 %
 
0 , [8u 2 U;u    u  
0]; (1)
and g : RU ! R is continuous, weakly increasing on U(X) = f(min2x u  )u2Ujx 2 Xg,



















The interpretation of the representation is as follows. The decision maker envisions a
set of possible ex post preferences. Each of these is an expected-utility preference repre-
sented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u 2 U, so U can be interpreted
as a (subjective) state space. From Equation (1), a lottery  weakly dominates a lottery
0 if and only if  has weakly higher expected utility than 0 regardless of the ex post
utility function. Equation (1) also implies that the set c(x) of undominated lotteries in a
6menu x can be computed from U as:
c(x) = f 2 xj@
0 2 x;U  
0 > U  g;
where U  0 > U   means u  0  u   for all u 2 U, with strict inequality for
some u 2 U, and  denotes scalar product. The set c(x) can be shown to be nonempty
and compact (see Lemma 1 in the Appendix). From Equation (2), the evaluation of a
menu x is fully determined by the set c(x), reecting our assumption that the decision
maker restricts attention to undominated lotteries. More precisely, for each ex post utility
function, the decision maker evaluates a menu x by the lowest possible expected utility
an undominated lottery in x can give her. This reects our assumption of aversion to
indecisiveness. Finally, the dierent possible ex post utility functions are aggregated
through the increasing function g.
Note that the set U of ex post utility functions plays a double role in the representation.
First, it determines the mapping x ! c(x), i.e. the set of undominated options for each
menu x. The larger U, the larger c(x) for a given x. Second, it determines the mapping
c(x) ! (min2c(x) u)u2U. The larger c(x), the lower min2c(x) u for each u 2 U and,
hence, the lower the ex ante utility of x since g is increasing. In the extreme case where
the decision maker is not indecisive between any two lotteries (i.e. % is complete), U




u    max
2x0 u  :
Thus, we are brought back to standard indirect utility for which menus are simply ranked
according to their optimal options. In the opposite extreme case where the decision maker
is indecisive between any two (distinct) lotteries (i.e. % is maximally incomplete), U



















Now, let V =  U and dene h : RV ! R by h(z) = g( z) for all z 2 RV. Then h is


















This is basically Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (2001)'s \ordinal EU representation"
with negative rather than positive monotonicity.
75 Axioms
In order to characterize the representation dened above, we now introduce several ax-
ioms. In order to avoid cumbersome expressions, we make use of the dominance relation
% and the set c(x) of undominated lotteries in a menu x in the statement of the ax-
ioms, but one should keep in mind that all these objects are derived from the primitive
preference relation % on X.
Axiom 1 (Weak order). % is complete and transitive.
This is a standard axiom, necessary for any utility representation.
Axiom 2 (Dominance transitivity). % is transitive.
Axiom 3 (Dominance independence). For all ;0;00 2 (B) and  2 (0;1), if  % 0,
then  + (1   )00 % 0 + (1   )00.
Axiom 4 (Dominance continuity). For all ;0;00;000 2 (B), the set f 2 [0;1]j +
(1   )0 % 00 + (1   )000g is closed.
These three axioms together mean that the dominance relation % is a (possibly
incomplete) expected-utility preference relation. In particular, Axioms 2 and 3 seem to
be natural consistency properties, given our interpretation of the dominance relation as
reecting the decision maker's certain judgments about her ex post preferences. Note that
transitivity of % neither implies nor is implied by transitivity of %, which is imposed
in Axiom 1. Independence of %, on the other hand, is weaker than independence of
%, which is not imposed (for a detailed discussion of independence for preferences over
menus, see Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini, 2001).
Axiom 5 (Indecisiveness aversion). For all x;x0 2 X, if for all  2 c(x), there exists
0 2 c(x0) such that  % 0, then x % x0.
This is our key axiom, stating that if every lottery that is undominated in x weakly
dominates some lottery that is undominated in x0, then x is weakly preferred to x0.
To understand its logic, suppose every lottery  2 c(x) weakly dominates some lottery
0 2 c(x0), and let y0 denote the set of all such 0's, i.e. all lotteries in c(x0) that are
weakly dominated by some lottery in c(x). Since y0 can basically be obtained from c(x)
by weakly worsening (in the sense of the dominance relation) all lotteries in c(x), it seems
natural for the decision maker to weakly prefer c(x) to y0. Now, c(x0) may also contain
lotteries that do not belong to y0, i.e. that are not weakly dominated by any lottery in
c(x). Such a lottery ^ 0 2 c(x0) n y0 cannot, however, weakly dominate any lottery 0 2 y0
(indeed, if ^ 0  0 then ^ 0 2 y0, and if ^ 0  0 then 0 = 2 c(x0), a contradiction in
both cases), so it is necessarily noncomparable to all lotteries in y0. Thus, such lotteries
8only create indecisiveness, so the decision maker must prefer y0 to c(x0) if she is averse
to indecisiveness. Moreover, if the decision maker restricts attention to undominated
lotteries, then she must be indierent between x and c(x), as well as between x0 and
c(x0). By transitivity, then, x must be weakly preferred to x0. Lemma 2 in the Appendix
gives formal insights into this axiom.
Axiom 6 (Undominated continuity). For all x;x0;(xn)n1;(x0
n)n1 2 X such that c(xn) !
c(x) and c(x0
n) ! c(x0), if xn % x0
n for all n  1, then x % x0.
This is a continuity axiom that is distinct from Axiom 4. Since the decision maker
restricts attention to undominated lotteries, the notion of continuity that is relevant to
our representation involves converging sequences of sets of undominated lotteries rather
than menus (note that we may have c(xn) ! c(x) without xn ! x and vice versa).
6 Representation Theorem
We obtain the following result:
Theorem. There exists an indecisiveness averse representation of % if and only if %
satises Axioms 1 to 6.
The proof appears in the Appendix, here we only provide a brief sketch for the suf-
ciency part. First, by Axioms 1 to 4, the dominance relation % is a (possibly in-
complete) expected-utility preference relation. Hence, by Dubra, Maccheroni, and Ok
(2004)'s Multi-Expected Utility Theorem, there exists a non-empty, closed, convex set
U  RB satisfying Equation 1. This is the subjective state space. Moreover, using
Axiom 5, it can be shown that x  conv(c(x)) for all x 2 X (see Lemmas 1 and 2 in
the Appendix), i.e. the decision maker restricts attention to undominated lotteries. It is
therefore sucient to establish the representation on the set C  X of menus that are of
the form conv(c(x)) for some x 2 X. On this set, % is complete, transitive (Axiom 1),
and continuous (Axiom 6) and, hence, can be represented by a continuous utility function
v : C ! R. Using Axiom 5 again, it can then be shown, by means of arguments from
convex analysis, that for all x;x0 2 C, if min2x u    min2x0 u   for all u 2 U then
x % x0. Consequently, one can dene a continuous and increasing aggregator g : RU ! R
such that v(x) = g((min2x u  )u2U) for all x 2 C, which establishes Equation 2 and
completes the proof of the suciency part.
7 Conclusion
We have introduced and axiomatized a representation of preferences over menus capturing
the notion of indecisiveness aversion. In our representation, the decision maker's ex ante
9uncertainty about her ex post preferences is captured by means of a subjective state
space. Since this uncertainty does not resolve before the choice of option, it gives rise to
indecisiveness at the ex post stage. More specically, the decision maker discards options
that are clearly dominated, and evaluates the remaining set of undominated options
pessimistically, as if she would end up with the worst possible undominated option, no
matter which subjective state realizes. This gives rise to a preference for commitment,
in the sense of preferring menus with fewer undominated options.
Our representation is ordinal in the sense that our aggregator is only required to be
monotone and continuous. A natural renement of the present model would be to look
for a more specic representation in which the aggregator has a linear form. That is to



















One thing to note about this representation is that it is not truly linear. This is because
it is not true that c(x + (1   )x0) = c(x) + (1   )c(x0) in general. In fact, it is only
true that c(x+(1 )x0)  c(x)+(1 )c(x0) but the converse does not hold because,
roughly speaking, by mixing between two menus one can get rid of some undominated
options. Therefore, this representation does not imply the independence axiom, but
only the following, weaker axiom: For all x1;x2;  x;y1;y2 2 X and  2 (0;1) such that
conv(c(yi)) = conv(c(xi) + (1   )c( x)), i = 1;2, if x1 % x2 then y1 % y2. This makes it
tempting to try to work on the class fconv(c(x))jx 2 Xg and parallel the proof of Dekel,
Lipman, and Rustichini (2001); Dekel, Lipman, Rustichini, and Sarver (2007a)'s additive
representation theorem. However, since this class is not convex, a similar argument to
theirs (in particular for Lemma S11 in Dekel, Lipman, Rustichini, and Sarver, 2007b) is
not at hand in our model. We leave the problem of axiomatizing a linear representation
of indecisiveness averse preferences open for future research.
Appendix
Lemma 1. Assume there exists U  RB such that % satises Equation (1). Then for
all x 2 X, conv(c(x)) 2 X.
Proof. First, c(x) in nonempty since x is compact (Eliaz and Ok, 2006, Lemma 3). Since
a polytope has only nitely many faces and each of these faces is closed, it is sucient
to show that c(x) is a union of faces of x. Let  2 c(x). We know that  belongs to
the relative interior of some face f of x (Rockafellar, 1970, Theorem 18.2). It is sucient
to show that f  c(x). Suppose there exists 0 2 f such that 0 = 2 c(x). Then, clearly,
0 6= . Moreover, by Equation 1 and the denition of c(x), there exists  0 2 x such
10that U  ( 0   0) > 0. Now, since  belongs to the relative interior of f, there exists
00 2 f and  2 (0;1) such that  = 0+(1 )00 (Rockafellar, 1970, Theorem 6.4). Let
  =  0+(1 )00. Then U(  ) = U( 0 0) > 0, so  = 2 c(x), a contradiction.
Lemma 2. Assume % satises Axioms 1 to 5. Then:
1. For all ;0;00 2 (B) and  2 (0;1),  % 0 if and only if  + (1   )00 %
0 + (1   )00.
2. For all x;x0 2 X, if c(x)  c(x0), then x % x0.
3. For all x 2 X, conv(c(x)) 2 X.
4. For all x 2 X, x  conv(c(x)).
5. For all ;0 2 (B),
 
 














Proof. 1. Follows from Axioms 1 to 4 (Dubra, Maccheroni, and Ok, 2004, Lemma 1).
2. Follows immediately from Axiom 5.
3. By Axioms 1 to 4, there exists a nonempty, closed, convex set U  RB such that %
satises (1) (Dubra, Maccheroni, and Ok, 2004). Hence the result follows from Lemma
1.
4. By parts 2 and 3 of this lemma, it is sucient to prove that c(conv(c(x))) = c(x).
First, we show that for all  2 X, there exists 0 2 c(x) such that 0 % . Let
y = f  2 xj  % g. Since x is compact and % is continuous (Dubra, Maccheroni, and
Ok, 2004, Proposition 1), y is compact and, hence, there exists 0 2 y such that    0
for no   2 y (Eliaz and Ok, 2006, Lemma 3). Suppose    0 for some   2 x n y.
Since 0 %  by denition of y, it follows that     by transitivity of %, so   2 y, a
contradiction. Hence 0 2 c(x).
Now, by denition, c(x) = f 2 xj@0 2 x;0  g and c(conv(c(x))) = f 2
conv(c(x))j@0 2 conv(c(x));0  g. Let z = f 2 conv(c(x))j@0 2 x;0  g. Then
z = c(x)\conv(c(x)) = c(x). We show that c(conv(c(x))) = z. Clearly, z  c(conv(c(x)))
since conv(c(x))  x. Conversely, let  2 conv(c(x)) n z. Then there exists 0 2 x such
that 0  . By the argument above, there then exists 00 2 c(x) such that 00 % 0
and, hence, 00  , so  = 2 c(conv(c(x))). Hence c(conv(c(x)))  z.
5. The indierence property follows immediately from the denition of %. Now, for
all ;0 2 (B), we obviously have c(fg) = fg and c(f0g) = f0g. Moreover, by part
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fg if   0;
f0g if 0  ;
conv(f;0g)) if  0 or  ./ 0:
We now show that  % 0 implies conv(f;0g) % f0g. Suppose  % 0 and
f0g  conv(f;0g). Then fg  conv(f;0g) by denition of % and, hence, f0g 
fg by transitivity of %. But since c(fg) = fg, c(f0g) = f0g, and  % 0, we
have fg % f0g by Axiom 5, a contradiction. This establishes the strict preference
property as well as the ( part of the noncomparability property. For the ) part,
assume  ./ 0. Then c(fg)  c(conv(f;0g)) and c(f0g)  c(conv(f;0g)), so we
have fg % conv(f;0g) and f0g % conv(f;0g) by part 2 of this lemma. Suppose
these two preferences are in fact indierences. Then   0, a contradiction. Hence one
of the two must be strict. Suppose the other one is an indierence. Then we face the
same contradiction as above. Hence both preferences are strict.
Proof of the Representation Theorem. Obviously, Axiom 1 is necessary for a
representation to exist. Given this axiom, we know that % is reexive and, hence,
Axioms 2 to 4 are necessary and sucient for the existence of a nonempty, closed, convex
set U  RB such that % satises Equation (1) (Dubra, Maccheroni, and Ok, 2004).
It remains to prove that Axioms 5 and 6 are necessary and sucient for the existence
of a continuous and weakly increasing aggregator g : U(X) ! R such that % satises
Equation (2). It is easy to check that these axioms are necessary. The remainder of this
proof is devoted to the suciency part.
Assume % satises Axioms 1 to 6. Let C = fconv(c(x))jx 2 Xg. Clearly, for all
x 2 X and u 2 U, we have min2c(x) u   = min2conv(c(x)) u  . Hence, by parts 3 and 4
of Lemma 2, it is sucient to nd a continuous and weakly increasing aggregator g such


















Since C is a subset of a separable metric space (Klein and Thompson, 1984), Axioms 1
and 6 imply the existence of a continuous utility function v : C ! R such that, for all
x;x0 2 C, x % x0 if and only if v(x)  v(x0) (Debreu, 1954). We now claim that for all
x;x0 2 C, if min2x u  min2x0 u for all u 2 U, then x % x0. If the claim is correct,
then we can dene the aggregator g : U(C) = U(X) ! R by, for all (ru)u2U 2 U(C),
g((ru)u2U) = v(x) for any x 2 C such that (min2x u  )u2U = (ru)u2U. Moreover, it is
clear that g is then weakly increasing, so the proof is complete.
12To prove the claim, let x 2 C and dene the sets
y = f 2 R
Bj8u 2 U;u    min
2x
u  g;
z = f 2 R
Bj9 2 x;U    U  g:
By Equation (1) and Axiom 5, it is sucient to show that z = y. Dene the set k =
f 2 RBjU    0g. Then k is a closed convex cone and, more precisely, is the polar of
the cone generated by  U. Clearly, z = x + k. Since x is a polytope and k is closed and
convex, z is closed and convex (Rockafellar, 1970, Theorem 20.3) and, hence, is equal to
the intersection of all closed half-spaces containing it (Rockafellar, 1970, Theorem 11.5).
For all u 2 RB, dene the set hu = f 2 RBju    inf02z u  0g. Clearly, we have
z =
T
fhuju 2 RBg =
T
fhuju 2 V g, where V = fu 2 RBjinf02z u  0 >  1g. By
denition,  V is the barrier cone of z and, hence, is the polar of the recession cone of
z (Rockafellar, 1970, Corollary 14.2.1). But since x is a polytope, the recession cone of
z is the recession cone of k and, since k is a cone, the recession cone of k is k. Thus
 V is the polar of k and, hence is the cone generated by  U. Since U is convex, this
latter cone is
S
fUj  0g and, since hu = hu for all  > 0 by denition, we have
z =
T
fhuju 2 Ug. Finally, since k is a cone and x is a polytope, inf02z u  0 >  1
implies inf02z u  0 = min02x u  0, so the latter equality implies z = y.
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